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Abstract. Nowadays, an ever-growing complexity of technical systems can be observed worldwide, problems of rational 
use of nature resources and diminution in negative impact on the environment are not completely settled yet, and 
international competition in different areas is strengthening. All the above tendencies cause an increase of different risks: 
technical, ecological, political, military and financial. Due to their nature, most of the risks are caused by a set of factors 
with commonly unknown relationships. Therefore, the need to use risk modelling methods that enable visual 
representation of the sets of cause-risk relationships becomes evident. This paper briefly examines two widely used 
techniques of modelling risky situations: fault trees and belief networks, and provides their comparative analysis. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Humans have always appreciated having the 
possibility of representing, evaluating and analysing 
risky situations. Probability theory, for example, has 
appeared to meet the needs of evaluating players 
chances in risky situations. Nowadays, probability 
theory is a developed field of science that is widely 
and successfully used in diverse areas of human 
activity including risk assessment and analysis. 
Any risk can be assessed using two components: 
probability of occurrence of a risky situation and the 
losses it might cause. When analysing this kind of 
situations, one has to account for many interrelated 
random factors (events) that might result in the 
occurrence of the top event related to unfavourable 
consequences. 
To clearly represent numerous risk factors and 
correlations among them, visual approaches to 
modelling risky situations are necessary. In this 
paper, two widely used techniques of this kind are 
considered: fault trees and belief networks.  
 
II. FAULT TREES 
The idea of fault trees was first proposed by the 
Bell Telephone Company for the purposes of US Air 
Force. In [1], the following description of the 
technique is provided: “Fault trees are a graphic 
“model” of the pathways in a system that might lead 
to a predictable undesirable event related to losses. 
Numerical probabilities of occurrence can be 
included and propagated through the model so as to 
evaluate the probability of the predictable undesirable 
event”.  
Risk analysis using fault trees comprises [1]: 
 graphical representation of chains of 
events/conditions leading to the unfavourable 
event; 
 identification of potential fault contributors 
that are critical;  
 better understanding of system characteristics; 
 qualitative/quantitative understanding of the 
probability of the unfavourable event selected 
for analysis; 
 identification of resources aimed at failure 
prevention; 
 manual for redeploying resources to optimise 
control of risk;  
 documentation of the results of analysis. 
Let us consider some common principles of fault 
tree construction using an example. Fig. 1 shows a 
sample fault tree. 
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A
B C
2 3 3 4
1
Top event
(T)
 2 0,02p   3 0,03p   3 0,03p   4 0,01p 
  0,05p B    0,04p C 
  0,002p A 
  0,02p T 
- logic OR gate
- logic AND gate
 1 0,02p 
 
Fig. 1. Sample fault tree 
 
In Fig. 1, nodes 1, 2, 3 and 4 represent basic 
events – failures of real elements of the system. Logic 
OR and AND gates between the nodes of events 
represent conditions of event occurrence in the 
intermediate nodes at the outputs of those logic gates. 
For example, an event in the intermediate node B will 
occur if basic event 2 or basic event 3 occurs; an 
event in the intermediate node A will occur if an 
event in the intermediate node B and in the 
intermediate node C occurs. To construct fault trees, 
other logic gates can also be used, but gates OR and 
AND are basic. 
If an intermediate node A has got n predecessors 
connected with by logic gate AND, then the 
probability of event occurrence in that node is 
calculated as follows: 
   
1
n
i
p A p i

         (1) 
where  p i  - probability of event occurrence in the 
i-th predecessor node. 
In its turn, if some intermediate node А has got n 
predecessors connected with it by logic gate OR, then 
the probability of event occurrence in that node is 
calculated as 
     
1
1 1
n
i
p A p i

        (2) 
where  p i  - probability of event occurrence in the 
i-th predecessor node 
The fault tree shown in Fig. 1 depicts initial 
probabilities of basic events and the calculated values 
of the intermediate events and of the top event T. 
 
III. BELIEF NETWORKS 
Belief networks are a singly-connected graph 
whose each node represents the complete group of 
random events. Quite frequently, alternative names 
for the belief networks are also used, e.g. bayesian 
networks, bayesian belief networks, causal networks 
etc. A fragment of a sample belief network is given in 
Fig. 2.
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


 
 
 
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2 1 1
2 1 2
2 2 1
2 2 2
/ / 0,05;
/ , 0,70;
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/ , 0,98
p c a b
p c a b
p c a b
p c a b




 
 
1 1
1 2
/ 0,30;
/ 0,10
p d c
p d c


 
 
2 1
2 2
/ 0,70;
/ 0,90
p c d
p c d


 
 
Fig. 2. A fragment of a sample belief network  
 
Here each node represents two random events. 
Nodes A and B do not have any predecessors. In Fig. 
2, these nodes are supplemented with matrices of 
unconditional probabilities of occurrence of the 
events connected  with them.  
Node C has two direct predecessors, namely, 
nodes A and B. In Fig. 2 that node is supplemented 
with matrices of unconditional probabilities of 
occurrence of events 1c  and 2c  for all possible 
combinations of events in nodes A and B. 
Node D has a single direct predecessor, node C. In 
Fig. 2 the node is supplemented with matrices of 
unconditional probabilities of occurrence of events 
1d  and 2d  provided that events 1c  and 2c  have 
occurred. 
The task of probabilistic inference in belief 
network is formulated as determination of occurrence 
probabilities for the events that are of interest to us 
using all the information accumulated in the network. 
For example, for the fragment of belief network in 
Fig. 2, the task can be to calculate the prior 
probabilities of occurrence of events 1d and 2d  
based on the information about event occurrence 
probabilities in nodes A, B and C. Provided that an 
event has occurred in some node of the network, one 
can calculate the posterior probabilities of events in 
all nodes of the network. 
A great deal of both accurate and approximate 
algorithms for probabilistic inference in belief 
networks have been proposed. The most common 
algorithm is described in [2]. More details about the 
algorithm can be found in [3] - [5]. The essence of the 
method is as follows. Special  - and  -evaluations 
are propagated through the nodes of the network. 
After these nodes have received evaluations from 
other nodes, the prior values of event probabilities of 
the nodes are calculated in sequence. If an event has 
occurred in a certain node of the network, the initial 
evaluations are recalculated. Special  - and  -
evaluations are then forwarded in sequence to the 
nodes of the network and the posterior probabilities 
of events in all nodes of the network are calculated in 
sequence. 
Belief networks are widely used to model risks in 
complex multi-aspect situations. Some examples of 
their use are provided in [6]- [11]. 
 
IV. POSSIBILITIES OF TRANSFORMING 
FAULT TREES INTO BELIEF NETWORKS  
Fault tree technique has several important points:  
(a) Events in all nodes of the tree are binary 
events; 
(b) The events are statistically independent of 
each other; 
(c) The trees represent logic relationships between 
the events. 
A characteristic feature of belief network is that 
the probabilities of event occurrence in network 
nodes are either unconditional or stipulated by the 
events in the predecessor nodes of relevant nodes. 
From that simple analysis it directly follows that 
different aspects of the knowledge necessary for 
successful risk modelling and analysis are encoded by 
means of fault trees and belief networks. So it seems 
attractive to combine the advantages of both 
techniques. One possible way to realise that idea is to 
transform fault trees into equivalent belief networks 
and then, using the obtained network representation, 
to apply the procedures that are in principle 
impossible for fault trees. 
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This paper employs the algorithm for fault trees 
transformation into belief networks presented in [12]. 
Simplistically, the algorithm consists in the execution 
of these procedures: 
1. For each terminate node in the fault tree, a root 
node is created in the belief network. 
2. For the output of every logic gate in the fault 
tree, a corresponding node in the belief network is 
created. 
3. For each node in the belief network 
corresponding to the logic gate in the fault tree, a 
table of conditional probabilities is made where the 
probabilities characterize the states in successor node 
depending on the states in predecessor nodes. 
Fig. 3 shows a belief network obtained through 
the transformation of the fault tree depicted in Fig. 1. 
The nodes of that network corresponding to the 
outputs of logic gates in the fault tree, are 
supplemented with matrices of conditional 
probabilities. However, these matrices are not 
equivalent to the matrices of conditional probabilities 
in the standard belief network. In those new matrices 
there are presented probabilities of states t (failures of 
the respective elements) depending on the states of 
elements mapped by predecessor nodes. These 
probabilities can only have two values: 0 and 1. To 
explicitly show the difference of these conditional 
probabilities from common conditional probabilities, 
we denote the first probabilities by symbol q. 
 
1 3 A
2 4
Top
event
(T)
 
 
 
 
/ 2 , 4 0;
/ 2 ,4 0;
/ 2 ,4 0;
/ 2 ,4 1.
p A t f f
p A t t f
p A t f t
p A t t t
   
   
   
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/1 ,3 , 0;
/1 ,3 , 1;
/1 ,3 , 1;
/1 ,3 , 1;
/1 ,3 , 1;
/1 ,3 , 1;
/1 ,3 , 1;
/1 ,3 , 1;
/1 ,3 , 1.
p T t f f A f
p T t f f A t
p T t f t A f
p T t f t A t
p T t t f A f
p T t t t A f
p T t t f A t
p T t t f A t
p T t t t A t
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
 1 0,02q 
 2 0,02q 
 3 0,03q 
 4 0,01q 
 
Fig.3. Belief network obtained through the transformation of the fault tree shown in Fig.1  
 
 
Unfortunately, standard algorithms of probability 
distribution cannot be applied in the belief networks 
obtained through the transformation of the 
corresponding fault trees. For that purpose, 
algorithms for probability distribution in fault trees 
can be used taking into account the specifics of the 
transformed logic relations. 
At a glance, it seems that fault tree transformation 
into equivalent belief network does not ensure any 
advantages. That statement can only be true for the 
transformation of standard fault trees. Some 
situations of that kind are discussed in [12]. Belief 
networks enable modelling the situations that cannot 
in principle be modelled by fault trees. Suppose that 
an intermediate node A in  
 
the belief network is connected with its 
predecessors by a logic AND gate (Fig. 4). Let us 
also assume that the element corresponding to that 
node can be damaged due to some exterior reason 
(not known a priori) when other elements represented 
by nodes 1 and 2 are functioning properly. A situation 
like that cannot in principle be modelled with the help 
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of the fault tree; though it can be fairly simply 
modelled by means of the belief network. In Fig. 4, 
specifically, in the matrix of conditional probabilities 
of node A, instead of zero values of probabilities 
corresponding to the proper functioning of elements 
in nodes 1 and 2, there is written the value of 
probability q of element A damage due to some 
implicit external reason. 
Another example is the so-called noisy-OR gate. 
Let us have a look at Fig. 5. Let us assume that 
elements 1 and 2 can be damaged as a result of 
improper actions of the service staff. Here, the nature 
of the damage is such that the corresponding element 
continues keeping some extent of work capacity 
while element in node A continues to work properly. 
Such chances of maintaining work capacity of 
element A at the time when work capacity of element 
1 or element 2 is partly damaged, can sufficiently 
easily be modelled with the help of a belief network: 
in the matrix of conditional probabilities of node A 
there are written corresponding values of probabilities 
1q  and 2q  instead of 1. 
Different points of fault trees transformation into 
belief networks are also considered in [13]-[16]. 
1 2
1 2
A
A
 ,t f  ,t f
 ,t f
 
 
 
 
/1 ,2 ;
/1 ,2 ;
/1 ,2 ;
/1 ,2 1
p A t f f q
p A t t f q
p A t f t q
p A t t t
   
   
   
   
a) b)
 
 
Fig. 4. Graphical representation of the phenomenon of common reason of failure with the help of a fragment of belief network 
 
1 2
1 2
A
A
 ,t f  ,t f
 ,t f
 
 
 
 
1
2
/1 , 2 0;
/1 ,2 ;
/1 ,2 ;
/1 ,2 1.
p A t f f
p A t t f q
p A t f t q
p A t t t
   
   
   
   
a) b)
 
 
Fig. 5. Graphical representation of the noisy-OR gate by means of a fragment of belief network 
 
Good results have been shown by joint modelling 
of risks with the help of belief networks and fault 
trees. In [8], [9] a hybrid approach to modelling risks 
in socio-technical systems is proposed. Socio-
technical system is a system that comprises a 
technical part (say, manufacturing) and management 
and organisational parts. Besides that, the system has 
to take into account both the impact of the 
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surrounding environment on the system and the 
impact of the system on the environment. The authors 
propose to model all possible factors of risk and their 
correlations at the management and organisational 
levels using belief networks and to model risk factors 
and their correlations in the technical part of the 
system by means of fault trees. This kind of 
modelling enables successful incorporation of the 
advantages of both approaches. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Fault trees and belief networks are widely used to 
model and analyse different kind of risks. Fault trees 
enable a visual representation of all events leading to 
the occurrence of an unfavourable basic event and of 
logic connections between them. They however fail 
in modelling non-standard risky situations. 
Belief networks are the most appropriate tool for 
modelling qualitative relations among the factors 
(events). The edges in the graph of belief network 
explicitly represent probabilistic relationships among 
the events. Provided that a certain event (events) has 
occurred in the network, probabilities of other events 
can be recalculated using a formal algorithm. 
Belief networks perfectly suit modelling risks in 
complicated situations [6], [7] and in complex socio-
technical systems [8], [9]. Good results have also 
been produced by the joint use of fault trees and 
belief networks. 
Both fault trees and belief networks require a 
large amount of initial information. That does not 
cause any problem if sufficient statistical data are 
available. However, when expert evaluation of 
relevant probabilities is performed, it is more 
preferable to employ fuzzy probabilistic evaluations 
and use fuzzy versions of the algorithms for 
probability propagation through fault trees and belief 
networks. 
 
REFERENCES 
[1] P.L. Clemen, Fault tree analysis, 1993. [Online]. 
Available:http://rischioatmosfereesplosive.studiomarigo.it/pr
ofiles/marugo2/images/file 1736612536. pdf Clemens. 
[Accessed: Oct.27, 2016]. 
[2] J. Pearl, Probabilistic reasoning in intelligent systems. New 
York: Wiley, 1989. 
[3] A.N. Borisov, O.I. Uzhga-Rebrov and K.I.Savchenko, 
Verojatnostnij vivod v intellektualnih sistemah, Riga, 2002. 
(In Russian) 
[4] R.E. Neapolitan, Probabilistic reasoning in expert systems. 
Los Altos, CA: Morgan Kaufman, 1999. 
[5] O.I. Uzhga-Rebrov, Upravlenije neopredelennostjami, Chastj 
1. Sovremennije koncepcii i prilozhenija teorii verojatnostej, 
Rezekne: RA Publishers, 2004. (In Russian)  
[6] Y.Y. Bayrakarli, (2006). Application of Bayesian 
probabilistic networks for liquefaction of soil, 6th Int. Phd 
Symposium in civil Engineering, Zurich, August 23 – 26, 
2006. 
[7] Y.Y. Bayrakarly, J.W. Baner and M.H. Faber. "Uncertainty 
treatment in earthquake modeling using Bayesian 
probabilistic networks", Georisk, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 45 – 48, 
2011. 
[8] A. Léger, C. Duval, Ph. Weber, E. Levrat, and R. Farret. 
"Bayesian network modelling the risk analysis of complex 
socio technical systems", Workshop on advanced Control and 
Diagnosis, ACD’2006, Nancy, France, 2006. 
[9] A. Léger, R. Farret, C. Duval, E. Levrat, P. Weber and 
B. Iung, A safety barriers-based approach for the risk analysis 
of socio-technical systems. Proceedings of the 17th World 
Congress, The International Federation of Automatic Control, 
Seoul, Korea, pp.6938 – 6943, 2008. 
[10] G. Medina-Oliva, Ph. Weber, Ch. Simon and B. Iung, 
Bayesian networks applications on dependability, risk 
analysis and maintenance. The 2nd IFN Workshop on 
Dependable Control of Discrete Systems, DCDS’09, Bari, 
Italy, 2009. 
[11] L. Portinale and A. Bobbio, "Bayesian networks for 
dependability analysis: an application to the digital control 
reliability", Proceedings of the 15th Conference on 
Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, UAT-99, pp. 551 – 558, 
1999. 
[12] A. Bobbio, L. Portinale, M. Minishino and E. Ciancamerla, 
"Improving the analysis of dependable systems by mapping 
fault trees into Bayesian networks", Reliability Engineering 
and System Safety, 71, pp. 249 – 260, 2001. 
[13] Ch. Cornalla and P. Giudici, "Statistical models for 
operational risk management", Physica A 338, pp. 166 – 172, 
2004. 
[14] M. Hamada, H. F. Martz, C.S. Reese, T. Graves, V. Johnson 
and A.G. Wilson, "A fully Bayesian approach for combining 
multilevel failure information in fault tree quantification and 
optimal follow-on recourse allocation", Reliability 
Engineering and System Safety, 86, pp. 297 – 305, 2004. 
[15] Ch.-G. Jong and S.-S. Leu, "Bayesian-network-based hydro-
power fault diagnosis system-development by fault tree 
transformation", Journal of Marine Science and Technology, 
Vol. 21, No. 4, pp. 367 – 379, 2013. 
[16] N. Khakzad, F. Khan and P. Amyotte, "Safety analysis in 
process facilities: Comparison of fault tree and Bayesian 
network approaches", Reliability Engineering and System 
Safety, 96, pp. 925 – 932, 2011. 
 
 
 
